Political Science

Differently from the Cold War, emerging powers currently have chances to put forward their foreign policy goals. In their rise, countries such as Brazil, India, and China opted to follow similar sets of strategies within multilateral regimes. Ranging from blocking and free riding to cooperative behaviors, these states have enhanced their ability to promote topical changes in existing institutional settings. It does not mean, however, that their developing condition will necessarily prompt them to cooperate. As this paper will point out by means of a comparative analysis of the regimes of nuclear non-proliferation, peace and security, and climate change, these countries have more chances to cooperate when their interpretations of the principles and norms that compose a regime converge. Relying on how a country interprets normative frameworks and on the degree of membership a state has in a regime, this article challenges the notion that these three leaders of the so-called Global South would be relying on an all-encompassing cooperative multilateral behavior

Brazil’s recent inroads towards Africa reflect one façade of the country’s greater aspirations. Ranging from technical cooperation projects and a push for dynamic commercial relations to the promotion of inter-regional dialogues, Brazil’s presence in Africa also comprises initiatives in the security realm. Not receiving matching attention, endeavors in the security domain reveal Brazil’s aspiration of building the South Atlantic as a region in which South America and Africa can foster common ground, preclude extra-regional powers, secure maritime resources and develop naval defense industry. Amidst this background, I argue Brazil engaged in securitization practices in order to promote shared understandings and cooperation in both sides of the South Atlantic. In this work, I confront bilateral cooperation projects with African partners with the recent multilateral revitalization of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) in order to attest to which extent Brazil was able to succeed in region-building practices and could conform a coherent grand strategy. The conclusion confirms the existence of a disconnection between the bilateral and multilateral dimensions of Brazil’s engagements, which undermines the region-building process and minimizes the ability of this country to act in the South Atlantic.

Created in 2004, MERCOSUR’s Specialized Meeting on Family Farming (REAF) is a regional mechanism that aims to tackle asymmetries by means of promoting and sharing successful public policies, most of them directly related to social protection.1 Its inception is closely intertwined with the ascension of left/center-left wing governments in most South American states, a phenomenon some pundits define as the “pink tide”. Through the internationalization of domestic public policies, such countries established a platform that eases regional cooperation and endeavors to create a common framework for family farming. Its initiatives revolve around the assurance of social participation and the interchange of good practices.

Developing powers are able to influence the evolution of the liberal order. In their multilateral engagements, they can employ a variety of foreign policy and negotiation strategies, voice their preferences and strengthen their bargaining power. This study examines how developing powers interact with the principles and norms of multilateral regimes. It analyzes Brazil’s behavior and negotiation power in the climate change and peace and security regimes. More specifically, it focuses on two concepts recently asserted by Brazil: ‘concentric circles’ and ‘responsibility while protecting.’ While the former addresses the division of responsibilities in the climate change realm, the latter approaches the norm of responsibility to protect. A comparative analysis is conducted with respect to three explanatory indicators, two domestic and one structural. One of the conclusions is that Brazil has behaved in such a way as to uphold a legalistic stance towards the global order.

This work analyses Brazil’s foreign policy in the climate change regime. More specifically, it focuses on two initiatives that Brazil actively promoted, the BASIC coalition, which was established at the COP-15 in Copenhagen, and the concentric circles proposal, forwarded amidst the growing momentum for the COP-21 in Paris. By means of a comparative analysis, I look into three explanatory factors: (i) the structure of the regime; (ii) Brazil’s climate-related advantages; and (iii) its diplomatic expertise, for later seeing to which extent they account for Brazil’s behaviour in climate talks. I conclude that domestic factors played a more prominent role in the advancement of an individual proposal such as the concentric circles than on Brazil’s participation at the BASIC.